Complexity costs of strategies in repeated games played by finite automata

Clark, Joseph. (2002). Complexity costs of strategies in repeated games played by finite automata Honours Thesis, School of Economics, The University of Queensland.

       
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Author Clark, Joseph.
Thesis Title Complexity costs of strategies in repeated games played by finite automata
School, Centre or Institute School of Economics
Institution The University of Queensland
Publication date 2002
Thesis type Honours Thesis
Total pages 101
Language eng
Subjects 14 Economics
Formatted abstract In order to model son1e aspects of procedural rationality, some authors have used finite state machines to represent the decision process of a bounded decision maker in a game theoretic setting. States of mac11ines are costly, so larger machines attract larger complexity penalties, and are only favored if the increased size leads to overall increases in game payoffs. This thesis reviews some results relating to the inclusion of complexity costs into the standard mac11ine game framework, including an extension to an evolutionary setting. It then generalizes the framework to finite costs of complexity in a simple evolutionary setting, showing the conditions under which cooperative outcomes can be sustained in non-cooperative infinitely repeated games.

 
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Created: Thu, 18 Nov 2010, 17:10:35 EST by Muhammad Noman Ali on behalf of The University of Queensland Library