This study examines the factors motivating firms involved in takeovers to disclose earnings forecasts. It combines explanations for earnings forecast disclosure developed in general settings with factors specific to the takeover context. The hypotheses are based on a detailed consideration of the legal requirements for takeover disclosure, which are delineated by application to a recently litigated takeover. From these incentives, and from a consideration of the determinants of earnings disclosure in other settings, hypotheses are developed proposing relationships with variables associated with firm-specific factors (litigation risk, information quality, and firm size), and takeover-specific factors (hostility, bid consideration, and party to bid). The hypotheses are tested on the population of firms engaged in takeovers of listed firms in 1997 and 19~e. The disclosure decision is significantly related to measures of litigation risk (industry), information quality (presence of an adviser), firm characteristics (size) and takeover-specific factors (position, hostility and type of consideration). Forecasts disclosed by both bidders and targets had a positive bias. These factors suggest that the decision to disclose according to regulations is strategic rather than absolute. This paper contributes to the extant literature by developing a detailed model of earnings disclosure based on the disclosure regulations in place. Because of major institutional differences from the only previous research in this area, this paper presents unique results in its analyses of a complex earnings forecast decision.