This thesis examines the significance of the bilateral fishing cooperation arrangement between Australia and Taiwan. The catch per unit effort technique is employed to measure fishing efforts, and thus reflect the fluctuation of fish stock in the north and northwest of the AFZ. Cost a benefit analysis is applied as a methodology to evaluate the impact of the bilateral arrangement on both Australia and Taiwan, and also to estimate the investment viability of Taiwan.
One finding is that this fishing arrangement, like other foreign direct investment activities, had substantial, positive effects for both countries. Furthermore, the decreased rate of catch per unit effort may not be sufficient evidence to conclude that decreased fish stock resulted from the arrangement. The study suggests that the resource rent tax had substantial impact on the fishing profits of Taiwanese investment; an intermediate agency involved in the bilateral arrangement had the potential to facilitate market transactions and generate market failure.
This thesis indicates the need for traditional fisheries management measures. It underlines the effectiveness of observers and their log books programs, quota limitations and illegal fishing controls in the bilateral fishing co-operation arrangement between Australia and Taiwan.