Markets for influence

Menezes, Flavio, M. and Quiggin, John (2010) Markets for influence. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28 3: 307-310. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.002


Author Menezes, Flavio, M.
Quiggin, John
Title Markets for influence
Journal name International Journal of Industrial Organization   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0167-7187
Publication date 2010-05
Year available 2009
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.002
Volume 28
Issue 3
Start page 307
End page 310
Total pages 4
Editor B. Caillaud
N. Gandal
P. Bajari
Place of publication The Netherlands
Publisher Elsevier BV
Collection year 2011
Language eng
Subject 140213 Public Economics-Public Choice
140209 Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation
140104 Microeconomic Theory
Abstract We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximize profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.
Keyword Contests
Oligopoly
Strategy space
Rent-seeking
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ
Additional Notes Available online 21 October 2009.

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2011 Collection
School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Sun, 06 Jun 2010, 00:05:40 EST