Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker effort

Bradley, Steve, Green,Colin and Leeves, Gareth (2007). Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker effort. Working Paper Series 2007/026, Management School, Lancaster University.

Author Bradley, Steve
Green,Colin
Leeves, Gareth
Title Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker effort
School, Department or Centre Management School
Institution Lancaster University
Series Working Paper Series
Report Number 2007/026
Publication date 2007
Publisher Lancaster University
Start page 1
End page 39
Total pages 39
Language eng
Subject 1402 Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary This paper provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker effort. We use novel multi-organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. Earlier research has demonstrated very large negative effects of employment protection on effort. We find that the magnitudes of these effects are substantially smaller than those identified in previous studies. It has been suggested that the negative effect on effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We demonstrate that the absence behaviour of temporary workers is also influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that are unrelated to threat of dismissal, this has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.

Document type: Working Paper
Collection: School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Tue, 09 Mar 2010, 15:08:50 EST by Therese Egan on behalf of Faculty of Business, Economics & Law