Clarence Ayres Memorial Lecture (2007: evolutionary institutional economics

Potts, Jason (2007) Clarence Ayres Memorial Lecture (2007: evolutionary institutional economics. Journal of Economic Issues, 41 2: 341-350.

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Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
Author Potts, Jason
Title Clarence Ayres Memorial Lecture (2007: evolutionary institutional economics
Journal name Journal of Economic Issues   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0021-3624
1946-326X
Publication date 2007-06-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
Open Access Status Not Open Access
Volume 41
Issue 2
Start page 341
End page 350
Total pages 10
Editor Richard V. Adkisson
Place of publication Armonk, N.Y., U.S.A.
Publisher M. E. Sharpe
Collection year 2008
Language eng
Subject 1401 Economic Theory
Abstract The economic system is not ultimately made of resources, but of institutions. And because economic systems differ in their institutions, their comparative performance can be (partially) explained by these differences. Moreover, institutional differences are the outcome of an evolutionary process, implying that as institutions evolve, so do economic systems. Institutional significance, institutional difference, and the causal connection to economic growth and development are all therefore central to the revival of Veblenian institutional economics (Brette 2006; Hodgson 2007). Yet, this will require more than just a refurbishment of "original" institutional economics with new micro insights from evolutionary psychology, experimental and behavioral economics, complexity theory, replicator dynamics, and game theory. Why? Because as Brette and Mehier (2005) also argue, it is better to begin with a general theory of economic evolution and locate institutions within this, than to start with institutions and derive a theory of the economy. Toward this end, I propose an evolutionary theory of economic institutions derived from the rule-based analytic framework of micro meso macro recently developed by Dopfer, Foster and Potts (2004); Dopfer (2005); and Dopfer and Potts (2004; 2007). In this framework, an institution is defined as a stable (meso) rule population as the outcome of a (meso) trajectory. The central analytic implication of the evolutionary theory of institutions is that an institution is essentially a meso - not a micro or macro - concept. A meso-centered theory of institutions may provide, in this view, a useful map of the various schools of institutional economics in terms of the different aspects of the meso unit they represent. ©2007, Journal of Economic Issues
Keyword Economics
Institutional economics
Economic development
Behavioral economics
Evolutionary psychology,
Evolutionary economics
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) - Collection
2008 Higher Education Research Data Collection
School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Fri, 22 Jan 2010, 21:43:07 EST by Gerald Martin on behalf of Faculty of Business, Economics & Law