Psychological essentialism and stereotyping endorsement

Bastian, Brock and Haslam, Nick (2006) Psychological essentialism and stereotyping endorsement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42 2: 228-235.


Author Bastian, Brock
Haslam, Nick
Title Psychological essentialism and stereotyping endorsement
Journal name Journal of Experimental Social Psychology   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-1031
1096-0465
Publication date 2006-03
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.003
Volume 42
Issue 2
Start page 228
End page 235
Total pages 8
Place of publication New York, U.S.
Publisher Academic Press
Language eng
Subject 1701 Psychology
Abstract Research on implicit person theories shows that people who believe that human attributes are immutable (“entity theorists”) are particularly prone to endorse social stereotypes and to explain them with reference to innate factors. We argue that entity theories belong to a broader set of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. New measures of three essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, and informativeness of human attributes) were developed in a pilot study. In the main study, these beliefs were found to covary with entity theories, and to predict the endorsement and innate explanation of stereotypes. Essentialist beliefs predicted stereotype endorsement independently of popular stereotyping-related individual difference measures, and in a way that was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. We propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keyword Essentialism
Implicit theories
Stereotyping
Q-Index Code C1

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Institute for Social Science Research - Publications
Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) - Collection
 
Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 84 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 86 times in Scopus Article | Citations
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 129 Abstract Views  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Tue, 12 Jan 2010, 14:11:05 EST by Tara Johnson on behalf of Institute for Social Science Research