An introduction to auction theory

Menezes, Flavio. M. and Monteiro, Paolo. K. An introduction to auction theory. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
Author Menezes, Flavio. M.
Monteiro, Paolo. K.
Title An introduction to auction theory
Place of Publication Oxford, United Kingdom
Publisher Oxford University Press
Publication year 2008
Sub-type Research book (original research)
Open Access Status
ISBN 9780199275984
Language eng
Start page 1
End page 184
Total number of pages 184
Collection year 2009
Subjects 1402 Applied Economics
9002 Property, Business Support Services and Trade
Abstract/Summary This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory.(Publisher website)
Formatted Abstract/Summary
The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.

This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.

The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory.
Keyword Auction theory
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Multiple objects
Private values model
Common values model
Affiliated values model
Q-Index Code A1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ
Additional Notes Paperback reprint of 2005 first edition with an additional new chapter.

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Created: Sun, 19 Apr 2009, 09:52:03 EST by Kaelene Matts on behalf of Faculty of Business, Economics & Law