Do directors perform for pay?

Adams, Renee B. and Ferreira, Daniel (2008) Do directors perform for pay?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46 1: 154-171. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002

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Author Adams, Renee B.
Ferreira, Daniel
Title Do directors perform for pay?
Journal name Journal of Accounting and Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0165-4101
Publication date 2008-09
Year available 2008
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002
Volume 46
Issue 1
Start page 154
End page 171
Total pages 18
Editor R. L. Watts
J. L. Zimmerman
S. P. Kothari
T. Z. Lys
J. Core
M. Hanlon
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publisher Elsevier BV, North-Holland
Collection year 2009
Language eng
Subject C1
140207 Financial Economics
910206 Market-Based Mechanisms
15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
150201 Finance
Abstract Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards.
Formatted abstract
 

Keyword Attendance
Board meetings
Directors
Executive compensation
Incentives
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Additional Notes Available online 27 June 2008.

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) - Collection
UQ Business School Publications
 
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 45 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 60 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Wed, 15 Apr 2009, 16:47:57 EST by Karen Morgan on behalf of Faculty of Business, Economics & Law