Mixed Public/Private Health Insurance as an Evolutionary Game

Brown, H. Shelton (2001) Mixed Public/Private Health Insurance as an Evolutionary Game. Discussion Paper No. 290, School of Economics, The University of Queensland.

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Author Brown, H. Shelton
Title Mixed Public/Private Health Insurance as an Evolutionary Game
School, Department or Centre School of Economics
Institution The University of Queensland
Report Number Discussion Paper No. 290
Publication date 2001-05-01
Subject 340204 Health Economics
Abstract/Summary Most of the theoretical literature on private health insurance given a universal public alternative is partial equilibrium and static in nature. However, empirically, equilibria in these markets can take time to emerge and depend on other markets. This paper develops a dynamic game that describes the co-evolution of the public/private insurance and the public/private hospital markets. With a modest set of differential equations, a pattern of growth emerges wich is distinctly non-linear.
Keyword private health insurance
public health insurance
public hospitals
private hospitals
markets
health care

Document type: Department Technical Report
Collection: Discussion Papers (School of Economics)
 
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Created: Tue, 08 Jun 2004, 10:00:00 EST by Belinda Weaver (EA)