

## Alf Rattigan and the journalists: advocacy journalism and agenda setting in the Australian tariff debate 1963-1971

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### Abstract

During the early years of the 1960s a new breed of journalists started to file copy from Canberra; most had formal economics training and were critical of the protectionist policy of the Government. The arrival of these journalists coincided with the appointment of Alf Rattigan as Chairman of the Tariff Board. Rattigan, who died earlier this year, and the journalists would together pursue the reduction of tariff barriers and succeed in a critical reshaping of Australian economic policy, the legacy of which remains today. The contribution of the journalists in this key policy battle is clear and provides an important example of advocacy journalism. The ambition of the Government of the time to limit public debate through restricting media attention is apparent and sounds a warning for journalists of any era.

### Introduction

The death, earlier this year, of Alf Rattigan, the former Chairman of the Tariff Board (1963-74) and the Industries Assistance Commission (1974-76), makes it timely to reflect on the advocacy role of some key journalists in the debate on tariff policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. These journalists — including Maxwell Newton, Alan Wood, Max Walsh, Ken Davidson, Peter Samuel, and later P.P. McGuinness, Tony Thomas, John Edwards and Paul Kelly (Glezer 1982:330) — were central in reporting the costs of tariff protection and so helping to bring reform. This paper focuses on two of those people: Max Newton, because of his role as a journalist, editor and proprietor; and economist and journalist Ken Davidson because of his 1971 scoop that saw him obtain the leaked contents of McEwen's last Cabinet submission, publication

of which brought the public scrutiny that is credited with the final defeat of McEwen and his policies.

The debate over protection pitched Rattigan against the Country Party leader and Trade Minister, Sir John McEwen, who made all-round protection, or McEwenism, a central plank of Coalition economic policy. That policy was overturned by Rattigan, through his understanding of the workings of the public service, and with the help of journalists, a handful of pro-reform MPs, economists and some bureaucrats. While that battle of three and four decades ago is largely forgotten other than by those with economic and public policy interests, the legacy is an Australian economy made more competitive through lower protection rates and a pro-reform stance by Australia on the world stage. It is also a clear example of how journalists can help change national policy.

The journalists, with strong training in economics, were a new breed in the reporting of politics and economics in Canberra. They were able to understand and critically question government policy and write about it in a way that was intelligible to ordinary readers. Along with Rattigan's determination to reveal the true cost of tariff protection to all Australians, these journalists made the apparently dry topic of protection a front-page story. They were also motivated by their own opposition to protection and by concern for those Australians who were outside the tariff-making process, yet paying the price for protection. In short this was advocacy journalism as defined by Janowitz (1975:52):

The task of the journalist ... to represent the viewpoints and interests of competing groups, especially those of excluded and underprivileged groups ... the journalist must participate in the advocacy process ... he must point out the consequences of the contemporary power balance...

The journalists were helped by changes in the newspaper industry; the expansion of the *Australian Financial Review*, the launch of the *Australian* and by Maxwell's establishment of several newsletters, *Incentive* and *Tariff Week*. The attitudes and knowledge of these journalists would flow through to the editorial position of the papers they worked for; even the pro-protectionist *Age* would change its editorial stand to support tariff reform by 1967 (Glezer 1982).

Rattigan himself realised the usefulness of the media in bringing about change. But to get the media on side he had to overturn the traditional view among Canberra journalists that tariff policy was too dry, too dull or too hard to put across. The arrival of those journalists with economic training helped. And Rattigan set out to get the coverage he wanted: a key part of this campaign was Rattigan's appointment of Bill Carmichael, who had studied politics at Melbourne University, as the Board's development officer. "(Carmichael) proved ideal. He had an outstanding ability to see the critical issues of any

matter and a sound, but imaginative approach to the resolving of problems." (Rattigan 1986:21) In holding with Rattigan's approach of enlisting as much support as possible for reform of tariff policy, Carmichael's contribution was important both inside and outside the Tariff Board:

Carmichael was adept not only in mastering the economics of Rattigan's approach but also in getting the message across to the Board's allies in the bureaucracy and the press (Edwards 1986:95).

Carmichael's role was carefully formulated by Rattigan:

I didn't want at any stage to look as though I was seeking publicity at all. I did have a go-between, who was Carmichael ... only he could answer questions if I wasn't available to answer questions ... but basically we just put papers in their pigeonholes up there (in the Parliament House press gallery) on the information that was available to the public all the time (Rattigan 1998).

Rattigan was also able to build on his confrontation with McEwen; it allowed journalists to pitch the story as a struggle between two rival personalities:

There were some journalists who had studied economics and were prepared to put in the hard work in getting to understand (tariffs). There was something in this that made it very popular with the media because here was an organisation, in particular the chairman, at loggerheads with his minister. Now I realised right from the early start this had an advantage for the media ... I didn't go out to get publicity ... but McEwen ... made it for me (Rattigan 1998).

### Tariff background

Tariff history itself is well documented<sup>1</sup> and not the focus of this paper, but a little background is called for. Put simply, a 25 per cent tariff on an imported product costing \$100 pushes the price up to \$125; this protects local producers from competition, but consumers have to pay the higher price and face an increase in their costs. Australia boosted tariffs in 1929 as a response to the depression. From the start of World War 2 four non-tariff factors effectively protected Australian manufacturing: the war itself and the disruption it caused to trade; post-war supply shortages in overseas markets; the 1949 devaluation of sterling and the Australian pound against the US dollar; and by dollar import licensing and general import licensing in the 1950s (Boehm 1993:212). Tariffs — and the Tariff Board — increased in importance after 1957 when, on Treasury advice<sup>2</sup>, the Government started to relax import quotas, by 1960 import licensing was removed altogether.

The 1960s and early 1970s were a critical period in the evolution of tariff policy

The 1960s and early 1970s were a critical period in the evolution of tariff policy in Australia. McEwen, grasped national tariff policy and won the support of the manufacturing sector through his willingness to protect Australian industry from foreign competition. McEwen was able to exploit a national apathy on tariffs; most Australians accepted protection for industry, without giving it too much thought. Those arguments in favour of protection were support for local manufacturing, employment opportunities, wage maintenance, population growth and self-sufficiency. In the 1960s the Labor Party supported tariffs, largely because of union concerns over jobs and wages. The Liberal Party was content to let its junior partner in the Coalition set tariff policy because of Prime Minister Robert Menzies' concerns with Coalition unity. McEwen's greatest problem was his own Country Party because the tariff imposed a cost burden on rural exporters, and he attempted to solve this through compensation for farmers.

In 1963, McEwen sought out Rattigan for the chairmanship of the Tariff Board; a move apparently based on the belief that Rattigan, a former bureaucrat in the Department of Trade and Comptroller-General of Customs, would support his policy. Rattigan, a former navy midshipman, was described by Max Newton (1965:11) as a "mild man, with twinkle in his eye". McEwen, an orphan and a self-made man with a soldier settlement in Victoria, was widely described as dour and dark, and political journalist Alan Reid (1972:20) wrote that he "had acquired the public image of a man serene, detached and disinterested, but his personal record was one of turbulence and ruthless involvement". McEwen's decision to select Rattigan, whose opposition to the inefficiencies brought about through protection started to develop in the late 1950s yet remained unstated for a considerable period, has been termed "probably the most serious political miscalculation McEwen made in nearly 37 years in federal politics" (Wood 1994: 29-30).

### Maxwell Newton

After studying Economics at Cambridge, Perth-born Newton worked for Treasury before moving into journalism, later editing the *Australian Financial Review* and the *Australian* before starting his own political and economic newsletters. Newton was a determined campaigner against Australia's high tariff barriers, the associated political favours in Canberra and the administrators he considered were putting their interests ahead of national interests. Newton shared the anti-tariff sentiment that flowed out of Western Australia; his friends at university included John Stone, another opponent of high protection and later Treasury Secretary, and Austin Holmes, who would go on to head the Research Department of the Reserve Bank of Australia.

Newton arrived in Canberra in 1957 as a correspondent for both the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Australian Financial Review* and turned to his old Treasury friends:

I became friendly with Tom Strong, the head of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. He was really the one who opened my eyes to Alan Westerman (a McEwen ally and the Head of the Department of Trade) and the whole of his Department of Trade apparatus. Alf Rattigan, when he was Chairman of the Tariff Board, was tremendously helpful to me (Newton 1993:10).

In 1960, Newton returned to Sydney as Managing Editor of the *Australian Financial Review* and the paper expanded, going from a weekly to a bi-weekly in 1961. Maxwell sent journalist Alan Wood to Canberra specifically to report on tariffs. Wood recalls Newton told him: "We're sending you to Canberra, take on tariffs as an issue. We're going to pull this bloody McEwen on." (Newton 1993:124) It was an unusual move by any newspaper at the time. Wood, now Economics Editor of the *Australian*, recalled:

My instructions were to develop a tariff round because Newton considered it an important national policy issue and no newspaper was covering it. The timing could not have been better, with tariff policy taking on a new significance following the abolition of import quotas. But in the early 1960s this was not yet widely appreciated, and as I diligently attended Tariff Board meetings my colleagues in the press gallery were much amused by my incomprehensible activities (Wood 1994:9-10).

Rattigan said of Wood:

I think he and Ken Davidson (then with the *Australian*) and so on were very important because they were able to grasp the essential things about it (the tariff). They weren't just concerned about the dispute between me and the Minister. They were able to bring out what was the effect of it. So they were very important (Rattigan 1998).

When Newton became the first editor of the *Australian* newspaper in 1964, he expected to retain the editorial freedom he had enjoyed at the *Financial Review*. But he eventually found himself at odds with owner Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch supported protectionism and was a friend of McEwen's. McEwen later advised Murdoch in his purchase of a property outside Canberra and, in 1969, also influenced then Prime Minister, John Gorton, to ease foreign exchange restrictions to allow Murdoch to export the funds to buy the *News of the World* in Britain (Golding 1996:30). It was only in 1992, and admitting that he would not have done so earlier, that Murdoch spoke against government intervention in business and warned of the danger of what he called Australia's "protected and obsolete industries" (Newton 1993:252).

attack McEwen, the Department of Trade and the tariff system. He was critical of many areas: McEwen's disregard for the independence of the Tariff Board; of what he called handouts for industry and the rural sector; of government influence on investment and industry in Australia; Trade's efforts to take over other areas of responsibility; the friction between the Country Party and the Liberals; and McEwen's own performance. Increasingly there was approval for Rattigan and the work of the Tariff Board. *Incentive* may have been a slim, limited circulation newsletter, but its editorial stand and reports provided a guide for other journalists and newspapers, as P.P. McGuinness recalls:

What Newton did was point Australian economic journalism in a new direction, looking at the economic issues and corruption surrounding the use of the tariff system and other forms of industry protection ... (the) government was becoming a captive of domestic manufacturing interests and the development policies of such as 'Black Jack' McEwen (cited in Newton 1993:156-7).

Newton would highlight McEwen's practice of putting "added words" into references he sent to Rattigan; these added words indicated the protection McEwen wanted the Tariff Board to provide for particular manufacturers and industries (Newton 1965:11). Newton's articles brought this response from McEwen during a lunch with Rattigan and the Board members and is one illustration of McEwen's view of journalists: "there is always nonsense being written by some snide fellow, one of the press people, saying that I am bringing undue pressure on the Tariff Board" (Rattigan 1998). Rattigan would write a number of letters to McEwen about the added references, and press reports about the correspondence would eventually force McEwen to make the letters public, helping strengthen Rattigan's authority.

A look through the back copies of *Incentive* reveals the style and nature of Newton's contribution to the struggle over tariff policy:

Mr McEwen has been able so far to win all the big battles on tariff policy. But some of the recent actions by the Government in this area are so extraordinary that Mr McEwen may find some Liberal Ministers at last to challenge him in Cabinet (*Incentive*, No. 46, 1966).

In his remarkable and courageous speech to the *Associated Chambers of Commerce* ... Mr Rattigan gave the Government something very serious to think about and opened up yet again fundamental issues of policy relating to the tariff (*Incentive*, No. 100, 1967).

In McEwen's mind there was a conspiracy against him, his tariff policies and the Country Party. The conspirators, to McEwen, included Newton, Treasurer William McMahon and other supporters of tariff reform, who were siding with

Rattigan and the Tariff Board (see Reid 1972).

In his attack on Newton, McEwen accused the journalist of being a Japanese spy working against Australian interests:

Newton was paid by the Japanese to undermine the Australian tariff policy ... he (Newton) was agent of the Japanese government. He should not be in the Press Gallery. He was influencing other men in the Press Gallery. They worked for him. Because he paid them to do work for him, they got into the papers for which they formally worked, material undermining the Australian tariff policy (Reid 1969:74).

When Alan Reid, in his role as President of the Press Gallery, questioned Newton about his links with the Japanese, Newton explained that the Japanese External Trade Organisation, Jetro, was simply a subscriber to his newsletters and to an associated tariff information service he operated. The contributors who wrote for him included Max Walsh, Brian Johns, Peter Samuel and John Valder (Newton 1993:171). It is likely McMahan was feeding information to Newton. McMahan was well known for talking to the press; one of his nicknames was 'Billy the Leak'.

These claims and counter claims illustrate the level of animosity between McEwen and his critics and the passions of the pro- and anti-tariff advocates. Government antagonism toward Newton would peak on 23 May 1969, with a raid by the Commonwealth Police on Newton's Canberra office in search of leaked government documents from the Department of Trade. Newton died in July 1990.

### Small engines, big issues

A key aspect of tariff protection is that the cost to consumers is largely hidden. Rattigan wanted the costs revealed to Australians. McEwen and the manufacturers wanted the costs disguised by avoiding media scrutiny:

... above all, what the manufacturing interests feared most was public exposure of the deals which they were making or hoping to make to get "tailor-made" protection which would insulate them from the risks of the world market. Even now, it is a delicate matter to describe many of the deals which were done, or the way in which protection policy was made in the old days. Often enough, it would be difficult to not to suggest that there was corruption involved. Perhaps it was a matter of political favours and party funds (McGuinness 1986:14).

McEwen didn't hesitate to use his power in Cabinet as he and Rattigan moved further apart. Several examples illustrate the different approaches McEwen and Rattigan brought to tariff making and the media interest. In 1966 McEwen's

conflict with the Tariff Board flared when he advised Cabinet to reject two reports from the Board. The first of these was the Board's report on man-made fibres and yarns, which Cabinet rejected and referred back to the Board. The *Financial Review* headline on 10 March 1967 was "Government clashes with Tariff Board".

The more dramatic rejection came just days later when the Tariff Board reported on air-cooled engines not exceeding 10 BHP, a report that both McEwen and, following his lead, the Prime Minister's Department, branded unsatisfactory in confidential documents<sup>3</sup>. Not only did the Cabinet reject the report; it failed even to send the reference back to the Tariff Board as it had done with the textiles and fibre report. This time (on 15 March) the *Financial Review* headline was "Tariff Board future? Second rejection", under which Wood wrote:

... for the Government to reject the recommendations of its Board Chairman twice in a week is unprecedented. The Government's action on these two occasions and the statements that above accompanied them raise serious questions on the future role of the Board and its method of operation (*Financial Review*, 15 March 1967, p.1).

The case provides an insight into some of the issues that the Board considered in its inquiries. The small engines were protected by a general tariff of 42.5 per cent and a preferential tariff of 25 per cent, with an additional temporary duty of 17.5 per cent on some categories. In its report<sup>4</sup> the Board found funds invested in the industry were \$5.4 million and with about 850 people employed. The Board was divided over providing 75-per cent protection for three years or 55-per cent protection for five years until the future of the industry could be predicted. In confidential documents, only released to public view in recent years under the 30-year-rule, McEwen remarks:

I find this report to be highly unsatisfactory ... there is a school of thought in the Board that it and not the Government should determine tariff policy. The Government cannot, in my view, allow any suggestion that there is room for departure from the traditional policy ...<sup>5</sup>

The Cabinet notes prepared by the Prime Minister's Department accept McEwen's position. But, as well as considering tariff levels, the note acknowledges the impact of the report, the interest by the media and the Government's response:

The question arises of how the matter should now be handled ... these are pretty strong words, and will no doubt draw press attention in an area of Government policy which has recently received quite a deal of comment.

The note goes on to consider how McEwen's dissatisfaction could be made clear to the Board in a way that would "avoid public debate".

McEwen's last submission, Davidson's scoop

In October 1970, McEwen announced he would retire from Parliament early in 1971. He was determined that Australia would continue the tariff policy he had advocated throughout his almost 37 years in Parliament and prepared a submission to Cabinet outlining general guidelines for the conduct of tariff policy and controls on the Tariff Board. These guidelines would restrict the Board.

Before Cabinet could debate the proposals, however, they were made public by Ken Davidson in the *Australian* on 18 December 1970. To this day, Davidson, currently an economic columnist with the *Age*, declines to name who gave him the submission, but the leak highlights the growing disenchantment with McEwen and his policies:

The material came from the enemies of McEwen and McEwenism and they were myriad in the Government. You can be fairly sure they came from the Liberal side of politics... it was somebody who was highly placed in the Government. The important thing about that leak was that it was the first significant leak to come out of government ... the people who were opposed to McEwen felt they could only win by ventilating things in a sympathetic media (Davidson 1998).

The leak and the debate it generated were important in shaping Government policy. The leak is credited with Cabinet's subsequent failure to support McEwen's submission, ending McEwenism and therefore the direction of a key part of national economic policy. At the time, Davidson himself wrote "the fact that the document is public must surely mean that the chances of the submission receiving Cabinet approval are slim" (Davidson 1970:13). That view was supported by commentators at the time and since.

The McEwen submission to Cabinet aimed at emasculating the Tariff Board is the classic example of the low intellectual level of economic debate within the Cabinet and the nation at large. Had this document not been leaked, the probability is that the McEwen submission would have passed through the Cabinet almost without comment. As it is, the submission has now been exposed to public scrutiny — and to some extent to public debate (Walsh 1971:32).

The press outcry had a major effect on Cabinet. To have supported McEwen's proposals amid a chorus of criticism raised the political costs (Glezer 1982:106). Comments like these support Rattigan's strategy that public debate would encourage tariff reform and dramatically displays the role of the media in helping reform.

Over the next days and weeks the *Australian* and other newspapers continued to reveal details of McEwen's submission. Tariff reformers in Parliament, such as Bert Kelly and Senator TL Bull, lobbied MPs for the defeat of McEwen's plan. Activity on both these fronts gave the submission and the overall ques-

tion of tariffs an extremely high profile. If the Country and Liberal parties had been prepared to let McEwen have his way in the 1960s, they were less inclined to do so in the 1970s as this headline from the *Australian* illustrates: "McEwen's tariff plan alarms coalition".

Strong opposition is already building up in the government parties to proposals by the Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr McEwen, for new restraints on the Tariff Board (*Australian*, 19 December 1970, p.4)

McEwen tried to get public opinion on his side. In his submission and again on ABC television he was critical of the Tariff Board's classification policy and its impact:

...(in) the category of industry of questionable desirability or undesirability (the Board has listed) those industries which are shown to need 50 per cent or higher effective tariff protection ... industries in this category involve investment of \$3,000 million and have employees numbering 600,000. The total persons dependent on these 600,000 wage and salary earners, including wives and families, tradesmen and service industries, I am advised would be not less than 2.6 million people. To put under question, or in jeopardy, the livelihood of more than one-fifth of the Australian population is certainly not a matter to be left light-heartedly to the Tariff Board (Walsh 1971:1).

Those supporters of protectionism, such as R W C Anderson, of the Associated Chamber of Manufactures, urged McEwen to delay his resignation until his submission was accepted by Cabinet (Glezer, 1982:311), but critics of the Minister, including the media, were equally vocal:

The suggestion that Sir John McEwen should stay on to see his retrograde submission on tariff policy through Cabinet is grotesque. The most regrettable aspect of the matter is that a vitally important economic issue is being treated entirely on the political level. The reason of course is clear enough. The economics are all on the side of the Tariff Board (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 January 1971, p.6).

There is something almost heroic in the posture of that grand old warrior, Sir John McEwen, rising on the eve of his retirement to strike out against the Tariff Board ... His struggle to subdue the Tariff Board looks like being Sir John McEwen's last great battle. Sadly he deserves to lose it (Age 26 January 1971, p.9).

The decision on guidelines for the Board, the main plank of McEwen's submission, was deferred; there was no action on the guidelines before McEwen left Parliament, then the matter was dropped. The Cabinet blow against McEwenism was covered in front page reports such as these:

Cabinet rebuffs McEwen. Federal Cabinet last night inflicted a major defeat on the retiring Country Party leader, Sir John McEwen, when it agreed to a Tariff Board request for a sweeping review of levels of protection for manufacturing industries (*Australian*, 28 January 1971).

Sir John McEwen lost his last political battle last night when Federal Cabinet shelved his submission that it drastically reduce the power of the Tariff Board. The Deputy Prime Minister walked away from his final Cabinet meeting visibly upset (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 January 1971).

### McEwen resigns, tariff policy moves on

McEwen left Parliament on 1 February 1971, saying "I never regretted retiring when I did. My life in politics had been long and very, very hard" (McEwen 1996: 216). The commentators who had challenged McEwen in print also commented on his resignation. Maxwell Newton, in his own newsletters, was probably the most outspoken:

Many people, especially in the field of economic commentary, will miss Mr McEwen. His economic policies were just so consistently stupid that he always gave the commentators plenty to talk about.... Newspapers thrive on the silly, the bizarre, the corrupt and the disastrous... that is what people are interested in hearing about... and Mr McEwen was therefore the secret delight of every one of his avowed opponents in the media (*Incentive*, No.269, 1970).

Comment in the more mainstream newspapers was more subdued:

... somewhere in the 1960s Sir John cried 'wolf' once too often. The ability to instil fear in his opponents, that fear that so often meant victory in his earlier days, has been declining. A great many of the things he held to be natural truths have come to be questioned with increasing frequency and growing effect (*Australian*, 28 January 1971).

The theme in all the writings was similar: McEwen's policies were finished, the man himself belonged to an era that had passed.

Later appraisals of McEwen, some of them from the same commentators who had watched McEwen in office, were no kinder. In 1980 Max Walsh considered McEwen's tariff policy and concluded it was:

... a long term disaster for Australia. Not only did it distort the pattern of industrial and commercial development, bequeathing the nation with an inappropriate industrial structure, but it also created a generation of cosseted managers (Walsh 1980: 171).

And in 1994 Alan Wood was critical of McEwen's "fatally flawed vision that kept Australia parochial and inward" (Wood 1994:9).

In 1998 Rattigan said:

... (the legacy) it left us with, I suppose, was the one we're still trying to get rid off; the lack of enterprise and innovation ... it's the lack of competition so you end up in the situation where your costs are going up and the best people in the place aren't being used, or won't be listened to. ...(without tariff reform) in our friend Keating's words, we would have gone more and more into a banana state. I mean we were going downhill, the rate of improvement in the Australian economy was very, very low compared to most other economies.

## Conclusion

It is a reflection of just how seriously the government took the influence of the media in shaping public opinion in the tariff debate that the matter was debated at the highest level, in Cabinet. McEwen and the Government tried to avoid giving the media any material that would fuel the debate. Newton annoyed the Government so much that the police raided his office looking for documents relating to trade. Neither action sits well in a supposedly open democracy like Australia.

Rattigan and McEwen both recognised the role of the media in the struggle over tariff reform. Rattigan tried to help journalists, McEwen to block them. As Rattigan recognised from the beginning, tariff policy is a dry topic, and remains so to most people. Yet through their knowledge of its importance and their determination to make it an issue, journalists were able to elevate tariff reports to the front page and influence the direction of the debate.

Some of those journalists who went to Canberra in the 1960s remain leading figures in journalism and the media today. They were a new generation with new economic skills to focus on the unexplored tariff issue and to make tariffs, and the costs, understandable to other Australians. There are several points to consider today. As that group of journalists grows older and retires, will tariffs and free trade slip from the agenda? What other generational change is today underway but unrecognised in Australian journalism? What skills do new journalists of today need that provides a guide, as economics did for those journalists in the 1960s, to identify and challenge key policy positions? And what issues is the government of today disguising as the government then disguised the costs of tariffs and the policy of protection?

## Notes

1 Tariff history can be found in works by Boehm, E., Glezer, L., Rattigan, A., Bell, S., *Report of the Committee of Economic Inquiry*, 1965, and more.

2 Treasury advocated the changes because of good foreign reserves and to combat inflation. This was an early difference of opinion between Treasury and Trade. Treasury was also critical of the Vernon Report that was backed by Trade. Glezer, L. *op. cit.* p.168 also says Treasury was policy driven while Trade identified with McEwen's policy view and political needs. When McMahon became Treasurer in 1966, he and McEwen clashed on whether or not Australia should have ships in international trade, the level of foreign investment that was best for Australia, and the rivalry between Australian producers for mineral sales to Japan. McMahon was also able to delay McEwen's 1965 proposal for the Australian Industry Development Corporation. Treasury was instrumental in presenting an alternative to McEwen's last submission in 1971.

3 Cabinet Submission 116, March 1967 – Recommendations from J. McEwen and notes from the Prime Minister's Department. NAA.

4 Tariff Board Report No. 1791, 15 December 1966. NAA.

5 Cabinet Submission No. 116, March 1967. NAA.

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